Africa, African-Americans, and the avuncular Sam by Adebajo, Adekeye
Africa Today, Volume 50, Number 3, Spring 2004, pp. 93-110 (Article)
DOI: 10.1353/at.2004.0023
For additional information about this article
                                                  Access provided by UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN (20 Jan 2016 10:15 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/at/summary/v050/50.3adebajo.html
Africa, African Americans, 
and the Avuncular Sam
Adekeye Adebajo
This essay investigates U.S. policy toward Africa and high-
lights the role that African Americans have played in infl u-
encing this policy. It is inspired by the need for an urgent 
dialogue between Africans and African Americans on U.S. 
policy toward the continent. It begins by briefl y assessing 
the ignominious roots of Africa’s relationship with America 
and pan-Africanist efforts to liberate Africa from alien rule. 
It then analyzes the destructive effects on Africa of U.S. 
policies during the era of the Cold War. It criticizes the perni-
cious effects of stereotypical and simplistic coverage of Africa 
in the American media, and assesses U.S. policy toward 
Africa under the administrations of Bill Clinton and George 
W. Bush. It concludes by offering some policy recommenda-
tions for a more enlightened U.S. policy toward Africa.
The Ignominious Roots of A Relationship
Four centuries of a sordid trade in human cargo of Africans by American 
slave masters was followed by a century of colonial enslavement of Africa 
by European imperialists. These defi ning historical events have shaped 
the relationship of African Americans and Africans with the West, and no 
serious examination of U.S. policy toward Africa can avoid focusing on the 
blighted legacy of slavery and colonialism, both of which created a bond 
between African Americans and their ancestral home, resulting in their 
efforts to infl uence U.S. policy toward Africa.
Fifteen years after 1885, when European imperial cartographers met 
in Berlin to carve up Africa among themselves, the Pan-African movement 
was born, as the Trinidadian lawyer Henry Sylvester Williams organized 
the fi rst Pan-African Congress in London. Between 1919 and 1945, Pan-
African congresses were held in Paris, Brussels, Lisbon, New York, and 
Manchester. These congresses were at fi rst dominated by African Ameri-
cans like W. E. B. Du Bois and Afro-Caribbeans like George Padmore, at a 
time when Liberia and Ethiopia were the only independent African states, 





































demands were mostly limited to trying to secure education, economic 
development, and racial equality for Africans. Even as the supposedly liberal 
American president Woodrow Wilson, meeting with European statesmen in 
Versailles to redraw the map of Europe after World War I, passionately cham-
pioned the rights of subjugated Central European minorities to national 
self-determination, Pan-Africanists meeting nearby reminded him of his 
country’s denial of the most fundamental rights to its own African-Ameri-
can citizens.
By the time of the fi fth Pan-African congress, in Manchester in 1945, 
its prophets were boldly demanding African independence from European 
powers that were exhausted and impoverished by their exertions in repel-
ling Nazi tyranny. Manchester shifted the center of Pan-Africanism from 
the Diaspora to Africa, as the meeting was dominated by future African 
leaders, including Nnamdi Azikiwe, Hastings Banda, Jomo Kenyatta, and 
Kwame Nkrumah. Du Bois effectively handed the torch of Pan-Africanism 
to Nkrumah at Manchester. Several of Africa’s fi rst-generation leaders, like 
Azikiwe and Nkrumah, had studied in the United States and confronted 
the racism that then pervaded apartheid America. These experiences would 
shape their struggle for political independence and leave a lasting desire to 
use Africa’s independence to fi ght for African Americans’ freedom.
Emperors of the Cold War
After World War II ended, in 1945, the United States fi rst portrayed itself 
as an anticolonial power, urging decolonization in Africa and Asia. With 
the onset of the Cold War, by the 1950s, Washington changed its anticolo-
nial rhetoric and talked instead of a global struggle for “containment” and 
“anticommunism.” It no longer urged its European allies—Britain, France, 
Portugal, and Spain—to surrender their African possessions, but came to 
regard the ubiquitous presence of France in Africa as a useful way of keep-
ing the Soviets out of the continent. France’s neocolonialism in Africa 
included establishing economic, military, and political relations with its 
former colonies—a strategy that allowed it to send troops to prop up or oust 
puppet regimes, tied the currencies of these countries to the French franc, 
and allowed French officials undue infl uence over the decisions of suppos-
edly sovereign countries. Washington provided military assistance to its 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally Portugal—assistance that 
helped Portugal continue its colonial presence in Angola, Mozambique, and 
Guinea-Bissau until a military coup in Lisbon in 1974.
By the 1960s, the Cold War’s main antagonists were two superpowers, 
the United States and the Soviet Union. With France, they turned Africa 
into a strategic playground to conduct their ideological games. They fl ooded 
Africa with weapons provided to local proxies in Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Somalia, and elsewhere. U.S. policy often ignored principles 

















ing the “red peril” in Africa through protecting and providing military and 
fi nancial assistance to often brutal and undemocratic clients in exchange 
for political support and military bases.
The cases of three American Cold War “emperors” in Africa—Libe-
ria’s Samuel Doe, Somalia’s Siad Barre, and Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko—are 
worth studying to illustrate the expediency and cynicism involved in U.S. 
policy toward Africa during this period. Liberia became a republic in 1847. 
Since 1822, the American Colonization Society had been transporting 
black American settlers, largely freed slaves from the antebellum South, to 
Liberia. Abraham Lincoln and other American politicians who supported 
the repatriation had naively hoped that this resettlement might resolve 
their own country’s racial problems. An Americo-Liberian oligarchy, con-
stituting only 5 percent of the population, held power by repressing the 
indigenous Liberian population. Political and educational reforms enacted 
by Liberian presidents William Tubman and William Tolbert between 1944 
and 1980 failed to heal the resentment felt by indigenous people against 
settler domination. Their spontaneous jubilation following a bloody coup 
in 1980 by low-ranking soldiers, led by Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe, sym-
bolized the level of hostility that had welled up against the ruling elite. 
Over the next four years, Doe eliminated potential rivals through exile and 
assassination. His tactics, typifi ed by blatantly rigged, American-condoned 
elections in 1985, closed off peaceful avenues for dissent and resulted in 
several military challenges to his regime, which culminated in a bloody 
seven-year civil war between 1989 and 1996.
The United States was Doe’s strongest external supporter. Largely for 
strategic Cold War calculations and fears of Liberia’s falling into the Soviet 
camp, it backed Doe, whom it rewarded with a state visit to Washington 
in 1982. Ronald Reagan described the Liberian autocrat as “a dependable 
ally—a friend in need” (Gifford 1993: 234). Doe supported America’s anti-
Libya policies and helped smuggle arms to UNITA (União Nacional para 
a Independencia Total de Angola) rebels in Angola. After the rigged 1985 
elections, American officials rushed to justify this farcical charade. Chester 
Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, described the vote 
as “a rare achievement in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World” (Liebe-
now 1987:293). In an era of Cold War, America’s strategic interests in Liberia 
appeared more important to Washington than niceties about human rights 
and democracy. The Reagan administration sank over $500 million into 
Liberia in the 1980s. In Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), 
the United States helped install Mobutu in power in 1965, and with France, 
remained Mobutu’s staunchest external ally for three decades. Like Doe, 
Mobutu closed the Soviet embassy in his country and adopted pro-Israel 
policies. He imposed a one-party state, rigged elections, and eliminated his 
rivals. Ronald Reagan described him as “a voice of good reason and good 
sense,” and George H. W. Bush went fi shing with him.
Finally, Somalia’s Siad Barre, the third US-backed Cold War 





































became increasingly brutal from the late 1970s, employing assassination 
squads, massacring hundreds of religious protestors, and bombing count-
less villages, towns and cities in a “genocidal campaign” against political 
enemies in northern Somalia. But the Somali tyrant provided the US with a 
strategic base on the Horn of Africa to protect Middle Eastern oil sea-lanes 
and to keep an eye on Cuban troops in neighboring Ethiopia. After the end of 
the Cold War, Barre, Doe and Mobutu were revealed to be emperors without 
clothes, humiliated out of power and abandoned by their errant, avuncular 
paymaster (Booker 2001; Clough 1992; Schraeder 1996).
Of Legislators, Lobbyists, and Libels
To infl uence U.S. foreign policy requires an understanding of the intricate, 
labyrinthine world of policymaking in Washington. A plethora of ethnic 
lobbyists and special interest groups seek to manipulate the policymaking 
process in their favor. Jewish Americans lobby for Israel; Cuban Americans 
lobby against Castro; Mexican and Italian Americans lobby for increased 
immigration from their ancestral homes; and, more recently, Polish Ameri-
cans have lobbied for Poland’s entry into NATO. It is generally believed that, 
the most effective, powerful, and wealthy group in infl uencing U.S. foreign 
policy is the Jewish lobby. The fact that Africa is a continent rather than a 
country makes it more difficult for US-based lobbyists to rally support for 
a diverse group of 53 countries.
Historically, African-American scholars and diplomats, even before 
embarking on their own domestic civil rights struggles, sought to infl u-
ence U.S. policy toward Africa. They advocated better treatment of indig-
enous people by the repressive Americo-Liberian oligarchy; criticized the 
brutalities of the Belgian King Leopold’s rule over the Congo; opposed 
Mussolini’s occupation of Ethiopia between 1936 and 1941; and, from the 
late 1940s, vociferously condemned the inhumane treatment of blacks in 
South Africa (Harris 1993; Skinner 1992). Though Du Bois lived out his 
last days in Nkrumah’s Ghana and wrote frequently about Africans’ plight 
under colonial rule, his heirs in America, preoccupied with continuing 
struggles to escape from the vicious circle of poverty, racism, crime, and 
homelessness, have engaged the continent only fi tfully. Even today, some 
of the most senior African-American officials and intellectuals reveal a 
stunning ignorance about Africa, limiting their ability to infl uence U.S. 
policy toward the continent. Du Bois himself was not free of some of these 
prejudice: he often described Africans as “backward peoples” in need of a 
mission civilisatrice, which his sense of noblesse obligé imposed a “black 
man’s burden” on him to fulfi ll (Sundquist 1996).
Africa had always been a cultural shield behind which African Ameri-
cans sought refuge in an idealized past, free of slavery and xenophobia and 
aggressive efforts by white Americans to obliterate their African cultures 
and identities. The idealized vision of Africa held by many of Du Bois’s 

















therapeutic balm to soothe the pains of racism and powerlessness in their 
adopted homeland. In American popular culture, comedian Eddie Murphy 
demonstrated the more absurd side of this perception of Africa in his movie 
Coming to America, which depicted an African prince living a palatial 
existence in an Africa complete with giraffes, lions, and elephants roaming 
free in his backyard as pets. Barbershop, a hit movie in 2002, produced by 
and starring African Americans, provided the other extreme view of the 
continent: a negative caricature of a stereotypical African character, a buf-
foon as inarticulate as he was inelegant.
Leadership struggles and divisions within the African-American elite 
could also weaken its ability to infl uence U.S. policy toward Africa. The 
historic battle between the gradualism of the intellectual Du Bois and the 
radicalism of the activist Marcus Garvey in the 1920s was replicated in the 
1960s by the divergent approaches adopted by Martin Luther King (inte-
grationist) and the early Malcolm X (separatist). That historical divide can 
perhaps still be seen today in the fact that the most charismatic and popular 
black leader in America today is the fi ery Louis Farrakhan, whose Nation 
of Islam preaches a gospel of self-sufficiency and self-pride. It is doubtful, 
as Henry Louis Gates has noted, that any other black leader could have 
mobilized the mass support that Farrakhan achieved during his Million 
Man March in Washington, D.C., in October 1995 (Gates 1998:123–154). In 
contrast, prominent black intellectuals like Henry Gates, Bell Hooks, and 
Cornell West are largely armchair revolutionaries in their “ebony towers,” 
even as leaders like Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton are accused of rank oppor-
tunism or embroiled in scandals. As Cornell West noted: “There has not 
been a time in the history of black people in this country when the quantity 
of politicians and intellectuals was so great, yet the quality of both groups 
has been so low” (1993:35).
The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and TransAfrica had their 
greatest success in infl uencing U.S. policy when sanctions were imposed 
on South Africa’s apartheid regime in 1986, after two-thirds of Congress 
overrode a reactionary Reagan veto. This result followed years of daily 
protests in front of the South African embassy in Washington, D.C., led by 
TransAfrica and involving African-American legislators like Ronald Del-
lums, Charles Rangel, and Julian Dixon. To head the drive for sanctions 
against South Africa, African-American leaders including Randall Rob-
inson, Walter Fauntroy, Mary Frances Berry, and Eleanor Holmes Norton, 
founded the Free South Africa Movement.Signifi cantly, infl uential white 
legislators like Edward Kennedy, Nancy Kassebaum, and Steven Solarz were 
in the forefront of the legislative struggle for sanctions, which eventually 
dealt a serious blow to the South African economy. Since parts of the United 
States itself had operated a racist, apartheid system until the 1960s, it was 
possible to rally support for this cause by comparing it to an experience that 
many Americans recognized.
In contrast to its success with South Africa in the 1980s, the African-
American lobby was spectacularly ineffectual in efforts to impose sanctions 





































(1993–1998), several members of the Congressional Black Caucus cam-
paigned to impose oil sanctions on Nigeria. In 1997, Congressman Donald 
Payne introduced the Nigeria Democracy Act, calling for the freezing of 
American investments in Nigeria and the imposition of an oil embargo 
on Nigeria. But some members of the CBC opposed the measure. William 
Jefferson, for example, described the act as “unimaginative” and “wrong-
headed.” Senator Carol Mosely-Braun and Louis Farrakhan visited Abacha 
in Nigeria, demonstrating the ignorance and insensitivity of some members 
of the African-American leadership in embracing African autocrats who 
brutalize Africans.
In response to the threat of U.S. sanctions, Abacha hired American 
public-relations and lobbying fi rms in Washington, D.C., including sup-
posedly liberal black Democrats, Washington and Christian, to wage an 
antisanctions campaign. If sanctions were imposed, Abacha threatened 
to retaliate against American oil companies in Nigeria—Chevron, Exxon, 
and Mobil. The American oil giants questioned the efficacy of a unilateral 
U.S. oil embargo and tirelessly reiterated their fears that European compa-
nies would move in to fi ll the vacuum. Senior American officials quietly 
dropped their previous threats of oil sanctions. Carol Mosely-Braun, Wil-
liam Jefferson, and other African-American members of Congress spoke out 
against sanctions and in favor of a policy of “constructive dialogue” with 
the Abacha regime. Mosely-Braun’s ill-advised visit to the Abacha family 
in Abuja was effectively deployed against her when she lost her senate seat 
in 1998
A national summit on Africa was held in Washington, D.C., in Febru-
ary 2000. This summit involved government officials, the private sector, 
and civil society actors from across the United States who gathered, after 
several regional summits, to share perspectives on how to build a viable 
constituency for Africa in America.
To infl uence U.S. policy toward Africa, it is important to under-
stand the different government agencies and departments involved in the 
process. Some of the most important decision-making bodies include the 
Policy Coordinating Committee for Africa and the Deputies Committee, at 
which representatives from the State and Defense departments, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the 
U.S. Information Agency, the National Security Council, and the Treasury 
Department gather to discuss how to act toward Africa. The debates in 
these forums are often critical in infl uencing US policy toward Africa. The 
American decision to intervene in Somalia in 1992 and the decision not 
to intervene in Liberia in 1990 emerged largely from these policy debates. 
African policy is often left to mid-level officials, with senior administration 
officials tending to focus on more strategic areas of the world. As Michael 
Clough noted, Africanists in the State Department often follow three basic 
rules: don’t spend much money; don’t create situations that could lead to 
domestic controversies; and don’t let African issues complicate policy in 

















There is still a lack of a powerful, cohesive domestic constituency 
on Africa in the U.S., a constituency that could wield the infl uence of the 
Jewish-American or Cuban-American lobbies. U.S. policy toward Africa is 
not based on consistent Congressional support, and is often based on seek-
ing ad hoc coalitions in support of specifi c policies. To infl uence Uncle 
Sam’s policies toward Africa, it is important that African-American lobby-
ists work more closely with Washington-based NGOs in fi elds as diverse as 
human rights, famine, AIDS, and the environment. The tens of thousands of 
highly educated Africans in the American Diaspora must also be involved 
in building a constituency for Africa in the United States.
One of the most destructive factors in U.S. perceptions of Africa is 
the often libelous, stereotypical, and facile journalism on Africa in much of 
the American media. Media representations of Africa as a disease-ridden, 
war-ravaged “dark continent” of primitive savages and wild beasts where 
ignorant “tribes” fi ght endless wars are hardly likely to encourage support 
for Africa from instinctively generous, but often spectacularly ignorant, 
residents of Peoria. One of the most disturbing publications on Africa 
in recent times was Out of America: A Black Man Confronts Africa, a 
journalistic account by African-American reporter Keith Richburg, who 
worked largely as a war correspondent for the Washington Post in Africa 
between 1991 and 1994. After witnessing the horrors and brutalities of 
civil wars in Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia, Richburg thanks God that his 
slave ancestors made it across the Atlantic, wraps himself around the stars 
and stripes, and launches into a simplistic tirade about Africa: “Talk to me 
about Africa and my black roots and my kinship with my African brothers 
and I’ll throw it back in your face, and then I’ll rub your nose in the images 
of rotting fl esh” (1998: xvi).
It is hard to believe that a Balkan-American journalist covering the 
savage wars of secession in the Balkans of the 1990s would have rendered 
such a silly account and linked the brutality of the war to some inherent 
cultural fl aw in his ancestors. Richburg’s book provided cover to many 
white analysts to peddle their own prejudices about Africa, and added to 
distorted stereotypes about the continent without really explaining its 
diversity. The real problem with this book was not so much that it was 
controversial, but that it was simply awful, in substance and style.
Clinton’s African Safari
African Americans have often embraced Bill Clinton as one of their own. A 
myth has even developed that Clinton was one of Africa’s best friends, based 
on two brief African diplomatic safaris in 1998 and 2000 during which he 
felt the continent’s pain. It is important to demythologize Clinton’s Africa 
policy as one that in fact followed in the shameful neglect of his predeces-
sors; he was not a better friend of Africa than previous presidents. Continu-





































democratization, development, and confl ict management (Frazer 2003; 
Khadiagala 2001; Landsberg 2003; Ottaway 1999; Stremlau 2000). The Cold 
War–era obsession with “containment” was to be replaced by what National 
Security Adviser Anthony Lake described as a policy of “enlargement,” a 
policy that envisaged the U.S. seeking to enlarge democracies worldwide, 
rather than to keep tyrants in power. Though in Liberia, Zaire, and Somalia 
Uncle Sam had abandoned brutal clients on whom Washington had lavished 
billions of dollars during the Cold War, Clinton’s democratization record 
was abysmal. Policy often resembled that of the Cold War era, as strategic 
rationales were found to justify a failure to support multiparty democracy 
in various African countries. Anthony Lake’s “enlargement” was soon 
replaced by American support for a cantankerous warlord’s gallery that 
Clinton arrogantly dubbed Africa’s “new leaders”: Uganda’s Yoweri Musev-
eni, Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, Eritrea’s Isais Afwerki, and Rwanda’s Paul 
Kagame. None of these leaders could be accurately described as operating 
anything like a democratic multiparty political system, and most of them 
were thinly disguised autocrats. No sooner had Clinton anointed them as 
Africa’s model rulers than they went to war against each other: Ethiopia 
and Eritrea fought a bloody border war between 1998 and 2000, and Uganda 
and Rwanda, after invading the Congo in a bid to topple Laurent Kabila’s 
regime in 1998, soon fell out over strategy and the spoils of war in the min-
eral-rich country and turned their guns on each other. A large part of U.S. 
support for these regimes was based on its need to maintain an anti-Sudan 
coalition. All four nations together received $30 million in U.S. military 
assistance in 1996 alone.
An important concern of America’s post–Cold-War policy toward 
Africa is that a “green menace” (green being the color of Islam) may be 
replacing the “red peril” of the Cold War era, particularly after the bombings 
of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and, more signifi cantly, 
the attacks of 11 September 2001. The Clinton administration bombed what 
it erroneously described as a chemical factory in Sudan in 1998 in response 
to the East African embassy bombings. In Algeria in 1991, with Islamist par-
ties poised to win democratic elections, George H. W. Bush’s administration 
turned a blind eye when Algerian military leaders annulled the democratic 
elections. Washington has consistently refused to pressure the historically 
repressive regime in Morocco, the so-called “moderate” gatekeeper of the 
Mediterranean, to accept a U.N. referendum in Western Sahara, a territory 
unlawfully annexed and occupied by Moroccan military force since 1975.
In the area of development, more than three-quarters of American 
trade and investment in Africa was concentrated during the Clinton era, as 
it is today, in four mostly oil-rich countries: Angola, Gabon, Nigeria, and 
South Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa still accounts for less than 1 percent of 
U.S. global trade and investment. Newt Gingrich’s “do-nothing” Congress 
of conservative ideologues made good on its promise to cut the Development 
Aid for Africa from $802 million in 1995 to $675 million in 1996 and 1997. 
The numerical weakness of the Congressional Black Caucus and the lack 

















from restraining Gingrich’s ax. That $2 billion of U.S. aid annually goes to 
autocratic Egypt (Israel receives more than $3 billion) while 48 sub-Saharan 
African states, comprising some of the poorest countries in the world, have 
to share less than $1 billion of US aid annually, is the clearest sign that 
political and strategic considerations, rather than poverty and democratic 
considerations, continue to drive U.S. aid policy.
Undoubtedly, the worst failures of U.S. policy toward Africa in recent 
times were Clinton’s actions in Somalia and Rwanda. Somalia’s civil war 
erupted in 1991 after Washington’s former Cold War client, Siad Barre, fl ed 
Mogadishu. With an impending humanitarian catastrophe, the United 
Nations deployed peacekeepers, led by 25,000 American troops, to establish 
order and feed a starving population. After Clinton took office, the U.S. 
reduced its forces to 4,000, but pursued increasingly aggressive tactics, 
killing many innocent civilians in a hunt for the brutal warlord, Moham-
med Farah Aideed, who had murdered U.N. peacekeepers. In October 1993, 
in a secret, botched mission to hunt down Aideed, planned entirely by the 
Pentagon without the U.N.’s knowledge, eighteen American soldiers and 
about one thousand Somalis were killed. Despite Hollywood’s later efforts 
to rewrite history in the revisionist Black Hawk Down, there was absolutely 
nothing heroic about killing thousands of civilians, a large number of them 
women and children. To defl ect a strong domestic backlash and prevent 
Republicans from making political capital from these events, Clinton inac-
curately blamed the botched mission on the U.N. and withdrew his troops 
from Somalia, effectively crippling the mission without achieving peace 
in the country (Boutros-Ghali 1999; Clarke and Herbst 1997; Hirsch and 
Oakley 1995; Kornegay 1993; Sahnoun 1994).
Six months after the Somali debacle, the Clinton administration 
forced the withdrawal of most of a 2,500-strong U.N. peacekeeping mis-
sion (which included no American soldiers) from Rwanda, a mission that, 
if bolstered, could probably have prevented the 1994 genocide. The United 
States thereby blocked any effective U.N. response to the killing of 800,000 
people. Washington was being asked not to provide peacekeepers in Rwanda, 
but merely to mandate the U.N. to take action to save helpless victims 
of genocide. But with congressional mid-term elections approaching—as 
African-American NSC Director Susan Rice was reported to have reminded 
her colleagues—cynical political calculations took precedence over an 
international legal obligation to prevent genocide (Power 2002:359). In a 
bid to escape pressure for the U.N. Security Council to mandate a mili-
tary intervention to stop the killings, Clinton’s officials were ordered not 
to describe the massacres as “genocide” (Anyidoho 1999; Melvern 2000; 
Prunier 1995; Suhrke 1997). The conspicuous silence of the Congressional 
Black Caucus and other African-American lobbyists during this African 
Holocaust remains one of the most mysterious and disappointing episodes 
in recent U.S. policy toward Africa.
In light of these events, the constant depiction of Clinton by many 
African Americans as Africa’s best friend seems puzzling. At an Africa-





































presented as a close friend of Africa, and he beamed a video message from 
the White House touting his administration’s apparently successful Africa 
policy. The otherwise brilliant Toni Morrison’s curious description of 
Clinton as America’s fi rst black president reveals a certain naïveté. Even 
closer to home, Clinton shamefully surrendered to conservatives on welfare 
reform in 1996 by signing a bill which will almost certainly throw many 
black women and children into penury without state support and break up 
black families. In 1994, at the fi rst sign of ultraconservative opposition, 
he beat a speedy retreat over the appointment of prominent black lawyer 
Lani Guinier as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. These actions 
demonstrate the opportunism of a political survivor who turned pragma-
tism into an art of governance, effectively metamorphosing into a moderate 
Republican after Gingrich’s conservative troops marched on Congress in 
1994. Like Jimmy Carter, Clinton was simply another white southern presi-
dent who had grown up around blacks and could relate to them, but whose 
supposedly principled foreign policy ideals in Africa were often sacrifi ced 
at the altar of realpolitik.
Emphasizing the triumph of symbolism over substance, Clinton was 
also popular in many parts of Africa. Even Nigeria’s president, Olusegun 
Obasanjo, was not immune to a certain naïveté about his Africa policy. 
Following Clinton’s visit to the Nigerian capital of Abuja in 2000, the 
main street leading from the international airport was named after the 
American president as a tribute to his apparent contributions to Africa. 
This disappointing act would have been more appropriate for a supplicant 
banana republic than the biggest black population in the world. It was hard 
to imagine how the American president who, during an Africa tour only two 
years earlier, had urged Abacha, a military thug who was brutalizing his 
own people (and had imprisoned Obasanjo himself), to remove his uniform 
and become a civilian president, could now become a Nigerian hero.
Following the debacles in Somalia and Rwanda, Washington devised 
an African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in 1996 as a way of strength-
ening the capacity of African armies to intervene in humanitarian crises 
(Adebajo and O’Hanlon 1997; Campbell 2000; Frazer 1997; Omach 2000). 
The idea was that Africans would do most of the dying, while the United 
States would do some of the spending to avoid being drawn into politically 
risky interventions in an area of low strategic interest. But the $20 million 
annual cost of the program is derisory, and ACRI has mostly conducted 
training of armies in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda, without 
addressing the much more urgent logistical needs of African armies. The 
program has been criticized for supporting key American allies bilaterally, 
rather than the multilateral efforts of African organizations like the African 
Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Inter-
governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Two of Africa’s most 
respected leaders, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela and Tanzania’s Julius 

















in its formulation, and the plan had also not included a role for the United 
Nations, the body primarily responsible for global peace and security. 
ACRI was therefore thought to be vulnerable to unilateral manipulation 
by Washington.
Despite these disappointments, one of the few areas of U.S. policy 
toward Africa in which Clinton deserves some credit is trade. Congress 
passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in May 2000, 
granting more generous access to African goods, like apparel and textiles, 
in selected sectors of the American market. AGOA appears to be yielding 
dividends for Africa. In the fi rst seven months of 2002, African apparel 
exports to the United States exceeded $100 million, while 200,000 new 
jobs were created in Africa between 2000 and 2002 as a result of increased 
exports from AGOA (Versi 2003). But AGOA has been criticized as a plan 
to make Africa safe for American capitalism, allowing market access to a 
limited number of African goods in selected sectors of the U.S. market in 
exchange for low tariffs and access for American investors to a wide range of 
African industries (Robinson 2000). Signifi cantly, AGOA does not envisage 
opening up America’s wasteful and heavily-subsidized agricultural sector 
in which Africa has a comparative advantage, with about 70 percent of its 
population working in this vital sector.
In concluding this section, it is important to highlight the role played 
in the Clinton administration by two prominent African Americans: the 
late Ron Brown and Susan Rice. Brown, Clinton’s fi rst Secretary of Com-
merce, was an energetic champion in challenging France’s insistence on 
maintaining its former African colonies as an exclusive “sphere of infl u-
ence.” France’s role in Africa became discredited in the 1990s, after it was 
implicated in supporting génocidaires in Rwanda and backed a sinking 
Mobutu long after it was politically sensible to do so. Brown encouraged 
American companies to invest in Africa, traveled often to the continent, 
and was credited with establishing the U.S.–South-Africa business round-
table. He fought consistently to reverse stereotypical views of Africa. In a 
television debate before his death (in an airplane crash in April 1996), he 
employed formidable debating skills to demolish the Ghanaian conserva-
tive analyst George Ayitteh, accusing him of highlighting only negative 
events in a diverse African continent and perpetuating the stereotypes 
that make foreigners wary of investing in the continent. Brown was a true 
advocate for Africa.
In 1996, Susan Rice, a 34-year-old Oxford-trained Rhodes scholar at 
the time, was appointed Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs. The appointment of such a young and inexperienced Africa hand 
was seen by many Africans as the clearest sign of the low priority accorded 
to Africa in Washington policy circles. Rice’s Africa experience seemed to 
consist largely of her doctoral research on the peace process in Zimbabwe, 
though she had gained some experience in the National Security Council. 
Being young and female, she did not receive much respect from several of 





































Critics noted Rice’s inexperience in leading negotiations over the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, and Anthony Lake eventually took over 
mediation efforts (Negashi and Tronvil 2000, especially pp. 59–60 and 72). 
Even within her own department, some observers noted that Rice could 
be abrasive and insecure in asserting her authority over plenipontentiaries 
with far more experience than hers. Though her intelligence was widely 
recognized, she was regarded as somewhat out of her depth in the compli-
cated cesspit of African diplomacy. Like Ron Brown, she urged American 
investors to take Africa seriously, but she consistently refused to see any 
personal identifi cation with Africa when questioned by reporters during 
Clinton’s diplomatic safaris to the continent.
Bush’s Black “Dove” and White “Hawks”
During the presidential campaign in 2000, George W. Bush, coached by 
the fi rst female African-American National Security Adviser, Condoleezza 
Rice, reiterated his lack of interest in Africa and has since spoken about 
Africa as if it is a country rather than a continent: as Bush noted in June 
2001, “Africa is a nation that suffers from incredible disease” (Bruni 2001). 
Ironically, Bush has an African-American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, 
who seems to identify genuinely with Africa. Powell visited the continent 
within four months of taking office and identifi ed South Africa and Nigeria 
as key allies of the United States. During that trip, Powell vociferously criti-
cized African “dinosaurs” like Kenya’s Daniel arap Moi and Zimbabwe’s 
Robert Mugabe, calling on them to relinquish power. Washington was cred-
ited with playing a positive role in the South African–brokered withdrawal 
of Rwandan troops from the Congo at the end of 2002.
But the “dovish” Powell has to contend with powerful “hawks” and 
members of the white policy establishment in Washington—men like Vice 
President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Rumse-
feld’s deputy, Paul Wolfowitz. All three took control of foreign policymak-
ing, and have led the inexperienced Bush down all sorts of dangerous blind 
alleys. Cheney had voted against Nelson Mandela’s release from prison as 
a Congressman in 1986, branding the African National Congress (ANC) a 
“terrorist” organization. Walter Kansteiner III, Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, also opposed sanctions against apartheid South Africa 
in the 1980s, and as late as 1990 considered Mandela’s ANC to be unrepre-
sentative of the aspirations of most South Africans.
Powell has suffered some humiliating policy failures at the hands of 
these “hawks.” In the African context, his failure to attend, as scheduled, 
the United Nations World Conference against Racism in Durban in Sep-
tember 2001, was a disappointing policy defeat. Concerns over criticisms of 
Israel’s harsh occupation of Palestine apparently led to Powell’s last-minute 
withdrawal from the conference. This was the clearest sign, if any was 

















the powerlessness of the African-American lobby. In a global conference to 
discuss slavery, reparations, and racism—the issues closest to the hearts of 
many African Americans—the United States could not muster the will to 
send a representative to the conference. Powell’s presence—as the top diplo-
mat of the most powerful state in the world—would have sent a strong mes-
sage of some of the changes at the top of American society and given Powell 
the stature to argue America’s case from a position of moral strength.
Condoleezza Rice has often been reported to be siding with the 
“hawks” in the Bush administration. During the debate on the Race con-
ference in Durban in September 2001, she insensitively dismissed repara-
tions for Africans and their descendants in the Diaspora as an irrelevance 
of the past, revealing a stunning ignorance by many conservative African 
Americans, who neither care much about Africa, nor identify with, Afri-
can-American causes (Lemann 2002; Staples 2003). Many members of this 
group steadfastly refuse to acknowledge any sort of African identity. Even 
more liberal members of this group, like Susan Rice, seem eager to play 
down their African heritage. Powell, in contrast, seems to be comfortable 
in his own skin. The son of Jamaican immigrants, he has embraced a black 
identity not in a naïve way, but in recognition that his African identity 
does not make him any less American. As he noted during his trip to South 
Africa in May 2001, “Africa matters to America by history and by choice. As 
the fi rst African-American secretary of state so far, I will enthusiastically 
engage with Africa on behalf of the American people” (Innocenti 2001:1). 
He has identifi ed with, and spoken out for, African and African-American 
causes and courageously defended them, even in hostile forums, such as the 
Republican national convention (Barry and Thomas 2001; Cose 2001; Gates 
1998; Powell 1995). A controversial and notable exception was Powell’s 
support for the misguided U.S. policy of “constructive engagement” with 
apartheid South Africa under Ronald Reagan.
Following the failure of Powell’s strategy of securing U.N. support for 
the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, he has been seen as having 
moved into the camp of the “hawks.” He seems to be endangering his his-
torical legacy, as seen most vividly in his presentation of fl imsy and uncon-
vincing evidence to the U.N. Security Council in February 2003, to justify 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq. He has since told confi dants he did not entirely 
believe the case he was arguing at the UN (Keller 2003). African-American 
civil-rights activist and singer Harry Bellafonte’s stinging condemnation 
of Powell as a “house slave” may refl ect more widespread unease among 
his early supporters that he has simply become a servant of power, used by 
“hawks” to justify actions he patently does not believe in, as long as he can 
continue to parade as America’s top diplomat.
One of the most urgent policy challenges for the Bush administration 
is the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which killed 2.4 million Africans out of a global 
total of 3 million in 2000. Since the early 1980s, an estimated 17 million 
Africans are believed to have died of this disease (Ala 2003; Peters 2000). 





































to contribute $7 to $10 billion annually to a global AIDS fund. The United 
States announced a disappointing initial contribution of $200 million to 
the fund. Bush’s pledge of $15 billion to the global battle against AIDS 
(with most of this money set aside for Africa) in January 2003 was facing 
the prospect of drastic cuts by a penny-pinching Congress at the time of 
writing. This promise was the main focus of Bush’s largely symbolic visit 
to Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Uganda, and Nigeria in July 2003. Fail-
ure to deliver on this pledge will be seen by many Africans as yet another 
example of the empty rhetoric of another American president embarking 
on another diplomatic safari to the continent. Shortly after Bush’s visit 
to Africa, the United States deployed 200 soldiers to assist a Nigerian-led 
peacekeeping force in Liberia; the American soldiers were withdrawn after 
only two months.
What Is to be Done?
In concluding this essay, it is important to offer recommendations for a 
more enlightened U.S. policy toward Africa. First, Washington must support 
democracy more consistently in Africa and not make exceptions that are 
politically expedient for short-term policy gains. Genuine democrats must 
be supported and brutish autocrats shunned. To build a strong constituency 
for Africa, African-American lobbyists must support more education and 
research on African issues and continue to work with the Congressional 
Black Caucus, Africans in the United States, and NGOs with an interest 
in Africa. Initiatives such as the National Summit for Africa, must be 
sustained, and they must build support for Africa at the grassroots level in 
America.
In pursuing its support for confl ict management efforts in Africa, 
Washington must be careful not to incur the wrath of other African states 
by focusing too much attention on South Africa and Nigeria. This support 
should be multilateral, and not simply bilateral, and regional organizations 
like the AU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD badly need strengthening. This 
does not, of course, preclude bilateral assistance to the South African army 
or Nigerian police, but there must be a recognition that Africans are striving 
to establish more legitimate multilateral security mechanisms that should 
be supported. The funds available for ACRI—now renamed Africa Contin-
gency Operations Training Assistance—must be massively increased, and 
this military cooperation must be extended beyond training to include the 
supply of logistical equipment to regional security organizations.
Many Africans have expressed profound concerns that the U.S. war on 
terrorism will divert American assistance to Africa from economic develop-
ment and democratization to terrorism-related security issues. Many Afri-
can analysts have called on Washington to address urgently the root causes 
of terrorism—such as poverty, injustice, and social inequalities—rather 

















2002; Jordan 2003). The establishment of a U.S. military base in Djibouti in 
2002 to hunt down terrorist suspects in the Horn of Africa heightened such 
concerns. Antiterrorism, like anticommunism during the Cold War, must 
not become the new conditionality for receiving future American aid.
Washington must instead support more strongly the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a plan designed by African leaders to 
mobilize Western fi nancial assistance for Africa in exchange for “good gov-
ernance” by African leaders (Adedeji 2002; International Peace Academy 
2002; Landsberg 2002). NEPAD itself must be democratized to address the 
views of African civil society activists. The United States needs to play 
more of a role in annulling Africa’s $230 billion debt, which was largely 
accumulated by corrupt, monstrous African autocrats, many of whom were 
fed with western loans during the Cold War. Even with an AIDS epidemic 
threatening to wipe out populations in many African countries, these gov-
ernments are forced to use a quarter of their export earnings on servicing 
debts that everyone knows can never be repaid. Scarce resources that should 
go to health and education must not continue to go to service unpayable 
debts. The African Growth and Opportunity Act must be expanded to 
allow free access to Africa’s agricultural products, so that the continent 
can garner the resources needed for its industrial takeoff. This change 
must be effected not just out of an altruistic feeling of charity, but to take 
advantage of the potential of trade with an African market of nearly one 
billion consumers.
One of the most shocking and horrifying incidents I encountered as 
an African living in New York for fi ve years was the case of Amadou Diallo, 
a Guinean immigrant who was shot to death in New York in 2001 when 
four white policemen pumped forty-one bullets into his chest in front of 
his home. This case highlights the continued link between the struggles 
for racial equality of Africans and African Americans. The outrage that 
followed the policemen’s acquittal in a tragic American history of injustice 
from the lynching and castration of black men to countless cases of police 
brutality against unarmed blacks could be heard from the Bronx to Cona-
kry, and from Dakar to Harlem.
The Pan-Africanist torch that Du Bois had handed to Nkrumah in 
Manchester in 1945 was nearly extinguished when Nkrumah dropped it 
within eight years of increasingly autocratic rule and diplomatic isolation. 
The fl ame continues to fl icker, even as the heirs of Nkrumah, men like 
Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo, attempt to fulfi ll the vision of a 
united, peaceful Africa. It is important that Africans and African Ameri-
cans not surrender the efforts of Du Bois, Nkrumah, and their heirs to link 
the struggles for racial equality between Africa and the Diaspora by fi nding 
effective ways to work together to ensure a more enlightened U.S. policy 
toward Africa. American policy must be infused with what South Africans 
call ubuntu, the gift of discovering our shared humanity. In May 1994, I 
attended Nelson Mandela’s inauguration as South Africa’s fi rst black presi-





































of the old Negro spiritual, ‘Free at last! Free at last! Thank God, we are free 
at last!’” Nothing could have better symbolized the continued relationship 
between African Americans and their African ancestors than these words, 
spoken by the prophetic leader of Africa’s last racist enclave.
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